The Atman of Vedanta and the Sunyata of Buddhism
From the
prepublications at the South Asia Seminar, 2000 at The University of Texas at
Austin
Atman in Sunyata and the Sunyata of Atman
An attempt to reconcile the alleged
difference between Buddhism and Advaita Vedanta on the nature of the Self
by Bijoy H. Boruah(1)
Advaita Vedanta and
Buddhism are at loggerheads with one another on the
metaphysical issue of the self or soul. Whereas the former school of thought is
credited with the belief in the existence of the Atman or the soul as the core
reality of the human individual, the latter school is famous for the theory of
Anatman or denial of the existence of any self or soul substance. In
contemporary philosophical parlance, the Advaita Vedantin would be a realist
about the self and the Buddhist an anti-realist about the same thing. This is
surely a radical ontological antinomy. But what is surprising is that despite
such an ontological antinomy the two systems of thought have a more or less
common "metaphysic of transcendence" or a transformative teleology. They each
believe in the possibility of ultimate human liberation or enlightenment. The
ultimate liberation (Moksa) of Advaita Vedanta and the ultimate
enlightenment
(Nirvana) of Buddhism are in essence similar notions of attainment of salvation
or final freedom from the quagmire of human bondage. How would one reconcile the
fact that the two systems share a basically similar metaphysic of salvation with
the fact that they are arch opponents on the issue of the ontology of the self?
What I have posed as a perplexing problem should be clear once it is realized
that the question of the self is crucially related to the issue of ultimate
liberation. If liberation is attained in the form of self-realization or
self-transformation, then whether one affirms or denies the existence of the
self would seem to make a corresponding difference in respect of the possibility
of ultimate liberation understood as self-liberation. The perplexity is that
both an anti-realist (Buddhism) and a realist (Vedanta) about the self are
nonetheless convergent on the idea of the possibility of ultimate,
self-transformative liberation. Indeed, to converge on a common salvific
teleology while the two parties hold on to the radically divergent ontological
positions of self-denial and self-affirmation is to open up a curious
philosophical situation that demands closer scrutiny.
The Buddhist position is intriguing precisely because it claims the possibility
of emancipation without admitting that there is any self-same, enduring bearer
of the emancipatory experience. Ironically, self-extinction rather than
self-existence is said to be a necessary condition for the possibility of
emancipation. But we may pause here to reconsider the meaning of the concept of
self in question. Does the sense of perplexity rest on an ambiguity of the word
"self" as used by the opposing parties?
Apparently, it would be absurd to profess total self-denial while admitting
ultimate liberation because the experience of liberation, being enduring as well
as unitary, presupposes an experiencer of some sort. We would do well not to
short-circuit the Buddhist position into plain absurdity and examine whether
there really is no sense of self-affirmation in the overall metaphysical stance
of Buddhism.
On the other hand, the Vedantic position on self-affirmation also needs to be
subjected to a closer scrutiny in relation to its Buddhist opponent. What needs
to be examined closely is what really is affirmed when the Vedantin affirms the
existence of the self. What is the content of the self involved in Vedantic
self-liberation?
Why have I moved the matter towards a discussion of the content of the Vedantic
self in relation to the no-self thesis of Buddhism? I have done so in view of
the alleged dichotomy between the two systems of thought described in terms of
positive ontology (Vedanta) and negative ontology (Buddhism). Vedanta is
metaphysically Being-oriented, specifically the Being of Atman or the true
individual self, which is ultimately identical with Brahman or the Absolute
Reality. Buddhism is metaphysically oriented to Nothingness or Emptiness, known
as Sunyata, so much so that Absolute Reality is identified with Absolute
Nothingness. What I wonder is whether there can really be any substantive
difference of specific content between a metaphysic of Being and a metaphysic of
Nothingness, when both systems subscribe to an ultimate reality conceived in
equally metaphysically absolutist terms. The metaphysical "sphere" of absolute
Being may coincide with that of absolute Nothingness, and there may not be
"internal" content-specific difference between the two.
In keeping with the speculative remark I just made, I would now like to take up
the Buddhist notion of Sunyata for a careful analysis. Buddhists are arch
anti-realists when it comes to the existence of anything that can be
individuated. Sheer impermanence and transitoriness of everything characterizes
reality for them. There is no thing and no self in such a reality of ceaseless
flux. Hence, according to Buddhism, a right understanding of the world and us in
it would be not to reify anything into enduring individual entities or selves.
This is what gets expressed as the no-self or Anatman view. One is therefore
advised to empty oneself of the illusory representation of oneself as an
enduring and distinct self. Everything is devoid of any substantive essence. In
a sense, everything in reality is empty.
It might be helpful to think of emptiness or Sunyata, understood as Absolute
Nothingness, as a cosmic "field," and reality ultimately identified with this
field. Anything in reality would then be absolutely non-substantial, which
implies that there would be no non-illusory substantive self-representation in
this field. Consciousness, which is the content of the so-called self and
experience (and may be the content of the cosmic field as such), would be
absolutely empty of any ego-centric self-representation. It would be "pure"
consciousness, or consciousness per se.
Contrast this picture of Buddhism with the Vedantic depiction of reality.
Phenomenal reality, which is what appears as the world of sensible apprehension
in all its multiplicity, is held to be a false projection of cosmic illusion, of
Maya or Avidya. All relationality amongst distinct individuals, the whole world
as it appears to be distinct from oneself as subject in all its multifariousness,
is unreal from the transcendental standpoint of
Brahman. True reality is
Brahman, which is One, indeterminate, and all that there is. Brahman simply is.
We, the so-called individual selves, are each essentially an atman. Being an
Atman, each of us is not really distinct from other individual selves (or from
anything else whatsoever). As Atman, we are ultimately one with Brahman, which
is tantamount to being one with reality as such.
According to Vedanta, not to realize this oneness with Brahman, via the
realization of our true essence as Atman, is to remain spiritually blinded by
Avidya. Liberation as self-realization is the realization of our ultimate
identity with Brahman. Short of our understanding of our Atman-essence we are
each a Jiva, an individual ego distinct from other similarly "unrealized"
individuals. As Atman, none of us is really an individual self, but a universal
self merging with the absolute universality of Brahman. To come to have this
realization is to attain Moksa.
As it stands, the Vedantic metaphysics is realist, i.e. realist about the self
as Atman. It is the "being" of the self, rather than nothingness or emptiness,
which is clearly affirmed. The Atman is regarded to be the truest, and only
enduring, reality. Vedanta therefore strikes us as a reality-affirming ontology
in contrast to the reality-negating ontology of Buddhism. For Vedanta, there is
a reality with its positive identity once the illusory projection of a
phenomenal world is transcended. There is Atman-identical-with-Brahman to
constitute Reality. By contrast, the Reality of Buddhism is seemingly gratuitous
because sheer emptiness is supposed to be coterminous with Reality. Lacking in
any positive content or identity, the Reality depicted by Buddhism would seem to
make no room for the possibility of an enduring experience to count as an
experience of emancipation.
When Buddhism and Vedanta are thus juxtaposed in a comparative perspective, the
two systems present themselves in the form of a mutually exclusive relation. An
affirmation of the existence of Atman would presuppose a negation of the reality
of Sunyata. Conversely, identifying reality with the field of Sunyata would
entail a denial of the existence of Atman. So, either it is Atman without
Sunyata, or it is Sunyata without Atman.
We must recall the earlier discussion that both Buddhism and Vedanta with their
opposing ontological commitments nevertheless converge on the issue of
salvation. This means that Sunyata is no impediment to ultimate liberation. And
if the reality of Sunyata leaves no room for Atman, then it follows, by
implication, that the non-existence of Atman is also no impediment to ultimate
liberation. One might say here (with a mildly reactive temperament) that the
metaphysics of ultimate liberation is severely underdetermined by the ontology
of the self. But is the question of the self---its existence or
non-existence---so very neutral with respect to the possibility of liberation?
At this stage I would argue in the direction of justifying a negative answer to
the above question. I would claim that self-reality is intimately connected to
the reality of ultimate liberation. But in claiming this I would in no way imply
that the Buddhist way of conceiving of the possibility of liberation is
fictitious. Instead, my conclusion would be that true liberation or emancipation
is as much grounded in a metaphysic of Sunyata as it is founded upon its
counterpart metaphysic of Atman. But, then, I shall have to disentangle the
knotty problem of the antinomy between Buddhism and Vedanta discussed in the
beginning of this essay.
I think that a reconciliatory philosophical reconsideration of the ancient
debate between Buddhism and Vedanta would yield a picture in which the two
systems would be seen as being complementary to each other. With this intent I
shall start from the Vedantic angle to show that the concept of Atman is
compatible with that of Sunyata.
Granted the reality or existence of Atman, exactly in what form does it exist?
Can we say that it exists as an individual entity of some sort? To so exist, it
must satisfy certain criteria of individuation. But, admittedly, there are no
such criteria. Not being Jiva, it is not an individual existing in relation to
other individual entities. This is tantamount to saying that Atman is not really
an individual at all. It has no relationality except its relation to Brahman,
which is, after all, a relation of identity characterizing the non-duality
between the two.
Can the Atman be described in terms of any attribute apart from its most general
characterization as something of the nature of pure consciousness? And qua pure
consciousness---consciousness without any specific features---Atman is better
grasped as attributeless. It is as though we can get a grip on the concept of
Atman by subtracting from the "content-laden" concept of consciousness all
contingent specificities attached to the concept. Atman is consciousness
absolutely purged of all factual specificities---everything that consciousness
accumulates during its involvement with the empirical world or Samsara.
If Atman is attributively free pure consciousness, and attribute-free
consciousness entails consciousness not centred on any ego-specific point of
view, then it is a "decentred" self inhabitating a "centreless" world.
Consciousness decentred is also consciousness universalized, and a self
nourished by universalized, perspectiveless consciousness is evidently empty of
all inner encumbrances that accrue to a self of centred consciousness. At least,
part of attaining ultimate liberation is this freedom from the contingencies of
ego-centred consciousness. One could say that one meaning of the Buddhist
concept of emptiness is the idea of the self's emptying itself of accumulations
of inner traits born of ego-specific consciousness.
Once we conceive of the idea of a decentred self as having its life in a
centreless world of ego-neutral consciousness, we get closer to the idea of
Atman as identical with the universal consciousness of Brahman. We may even
think of the self's progressive decentering of itself culminating in a form of
transcendental subjectivity which is the perfection of centrelessness. Such a
perfectly decentred consciousness would then be a mirror image of Atman. But a
perfectly centreless consciousness would have to be absolutely devoid of
perspectival partialities of ego-centric consciousness steeped in the "push and
pull" of Samsara. It would be emptied of the delimiting attributes of finitude
to the extent of experiencing the intimations of infinity. It would undergo a
transformation of consciousness from its ego-specifically substantial mode to an
ego-neutrally "insubstantial" mode of Nothingness.
We now have a picture of Atman that depicts the self as consciousness without
any substantive content of empirically delimiting attributes. This picture also
seems to be akin to the Buddhist idea of nothingness or Sunyata.
Atman-consciousness is a kind of consciousness-as-nothingness inasmuch as it is
empty of the attributes of ego-specific subjectivity. Transcendence from the
life of a Jiva to that of Atman requires that the self render itself into
emptiness (Sunyata) as far as the perspectival subjectivity of the former mode
of life is concerned. It would therefore be no travesty of Vedantic truth to say
that there is a great deal of Sunyata in the inner constitution of Atman. The
Vedantic self is nourished by metaphysical nothingness. It is therefore no
wonder that Samkara, the greatest protagonist of Advaita Vedanta, has been
described as the Buddha in disguise.
Of course, one must not underplay the positive ontological connotation of Atman
in a bid to overplay the metaphysical nothingness of Atman-consciousness. While
the Vedantic self must negate all its ego-specific substantiality and transform
into consciousness-as-nothingness, it is precisely the fulfillment of this
negation that the true affirmation of the positive existence or substantiality
of the self as Atman consists in. Nothingness therefore is one side of the coin
of the Vedantic self, of which the other side is its ego-neutral or centreless
substantiality. Indeed, the substantiality of Atman is at its most pronounced in
its potentiality to attain moksa.
What, on the other hand, about the alleged non-substantiality of ultimate
reality as Nothingness or Sunyata? I think it would be equally wrong to overplay
the negative connotation of the metaphysic of Sunyata to the point of losing
sight of any affirmative connotation concealed behind that metaphysic. For one
thing, the admission of the potentiality to attain and experience Nirvana is a
clear indication of the substantiality of Sunyata-based existence. In this sense
Sunyata evidently has an ontic import; and it even suggests an ontology of self
akin to that of Vedanta. Buddhistic ultimate liberation---the attainment of
Nirvana---is a substantial unitary transition from the unenlightened condition
to the state of enlightenment. The possibility of this transition bespeaks of
the substantial presence of a shadowy self in the metaphysical vacuum of Sunyata.
Furthermore, Sunyata is not abhava or non-existence, but held to be the ultimate
ground of everything, the utmost original condition of reality prior to all
conceptualization and phenomenal distortion. It is characterized as pregnant
emptiness, vibrant void. Cast in terms of consciousness, Sunyata is a state of
pure consciousness that one would revert to if one were able to empty oneself of
any illusory constructions or impressions of an unchanging or permanent reality,
whether of things or persons. This reversal to original subjectivity, which also
has an ethical import, may be interpreted as one's "becoming" Sunya or empty.
But "becoming" Sunya does not mean going out of existence. Rather, one can truly
be oneself, or become truly self-aware, only by "becoming" Sunya. Otherwise, one
continues to be in an unawakened state---to be under the spell of Avidya.
Can we not say, now, that the Buddhist awakening in "the field of Sunyata" is
most akin to the Vedantic realization of the ultimate identity of Atman with
Brahman? And is not Brahman---the absolutely indeterminate (Nirguna) Ultimate
Reality---itself more like a "field of Sunyata," the original ground of
everything? It seems to me that these speculations about the "complementarity"
between Vedanta and Buddhism are on the right track. For such a reading of these
two systems of thought helps us make more coherent sense of either position than
what they seem to mean individually. What, then, is the complementary light of
Buddhism on our understanding of Vedanta? It is essentially this: Sunyata is the
only ground reality for the life of Atman. Atman without Sunyata would be like
motion without energy.
In a similar vein, it can also be said that "becoming" Sunya or being in (the
field of) Sunyata is virtually the same thing as being or "becoming" Atman. It
is important that we recognize the negative overtone of Sunyata and its cognate
Anatman has, as its counterpoint, an affirmative undertone. There is the
negation of the unawakened self---the self centred in an individualized field of
consciousness and shackled to the perspectives tied to it. This negation forms
the basis for a spontaneous affirmation of becoming awakened or
enlightened---becoming a decentred self. In essence, consciousness-as-Sunyata
manifests itself in the form of consciousness-as-Atman.
What transpires from the above discussions is a thesis that is better
characterized in terms of convergence of Buddhism and Vedanta than in terms of
their complementarity to one another. Of course each is a complementary
perspective to the other in so far as our making coherent sense of either
position is concerned. What we gain from such a complementary understanding of
the allegedly incompatible juxtaposition of these two ancient systems of thought
is that their apparent difference betrays a profound underlying unity. We have
intimations of a "hidden" Atman of Buddhism on the one hand, and of the "silent"
Sunyata in Vedanta on the other. A deeper study of the Vedantic Atman-theory
results in making the otherwise silent metaphysics of emptiness resonate with a
persuasive explanatory voice, much as a scrutinizing look at the Buddhistic
Sunyata-theory manages to get a glimpse of the shadowy presence of a
full-fledged Atman that explains the possibility of enlightenment.
It is a welcome sign in contemporary scholarship to find Japanese Buddhism
(especially the Kyoto school of Zen Buddhism) professing views that reflect the
compatibility of Buddhist ideology with that of Vedanta. Nishitani Keiji, a
distinguished scholar of this school of thought, is emphatic on affirming the
intimacy of the relation between Sunyata and the self. Emptiness is said to be
the "absolute nearside" of us. Sunyata is the field of ecstatic transcendence
and the "absolute nearside where emptiness is self." We are said to become truly
ourselves when we are empty, i.e. when we become decentred selves in the field
of nothingness. There is thus a pronounced self-assertion set against Sunyata.
Interestingly, Nishitani turns to "The I-Thou Relation in
Zen Buddhism" and
analyzes the nature of this relation in a manner which is strikingly Vedantic.
He talks about this relation as "non-differentiated", and adds that this
"absolute non-differentiation belongs to the I itself , and it is the same for
the Thou." The implication is that, once the self is in Sunyata, which is said
to be its "home ground," it truly becomes itself and then enters into the
"I-Thou" relation with the distinctive attitude of "absolute
non-differentiation." This is clearly indicative of the Advaita or non-dualism
of Vedanta. The non-duality of the I-Thou relation is emblematic of the ultimate
non-duality of Reality.
In contemporary Indian philosophy we witness a neo-Vedantic portrayal of the
I-Thou relation in a significantly different light. Ramchandra Gandhi presents a
highly interesting version of the I-Thou relation in the communicative framework
of the addresser-addressee relation. There is something uniquely sacrosanct
about my addressing someone by using the personal pronoun You. In being so
addressed by me, you are called forth as just yourself, in your pure and simple
personal identity, "untouched" by any contingent or de facto attributes which
happen to be true of you. To be identified as an addressee is, for Gandhi, to be
regarded as a person per se, when the person is not conceived under any
predicative-attributive frame of mind.
What Gandhi wants to show on the basis of the idea of a non-attributive,
non-predicative mode of person-identification is the availability of the
religious idea of a soul. When any one is called forth pronominally, the person
(addressee) is picked out by the caller (addresser) with an attitude of mind
which is characterized as an attitude towards a soul. Hence the idea of a soul
is implicit in the attributeless mode of thought in which the I relates itself
to the Thou. What it is to be a soul is thus articulated through a serious
exploratory analysis of the communicative concept of personal pronominal
designation.
The Gandhian idea of a soul defined in terms of non-attributive
person-identification can now be profitably linked with both Sunyata and Atman.
The addressee as a soul is very much modeled on what it is to be Atman. For you
to be addressed by me entirely non-attributively is to be thought of as a pure
personal subject, much as for me to adopt the non-predicative stance towards you
is to act as a decentred self. One might say that this formulation of the I-Thou
relation is a variation on the idea of inter-relations between Vedantic selves.
But it is also a variation on Buddhist Sunyata : for me to adopt the
non-attributive stance towards you is to place myself (as well as you) in the
field of nothingness. Unless I "become" empty or Sunya, I cannot absolve myself
of my usual attributive-predicative mode of viewing you or anybody else,
including myself.
What we are presented with here is a very fundamental human situation, a
situation of human communion in its most primary modality: addressing. I and
Thou coexist in the unitary field of Sunyata, which is the attitudinal locus of
non-attributive inter-personal regard. When we both partake of the infinite
field of absolute nothingness, there is no duality of I and Thou. There is
"virtual identity" instead, which means the relation is truly expressed as "I am
Thou."
1) Bijoy H. Boruah
Professor of Philosophy
Department of Humanities & Social Sciences
Indian Institute of Technology, Kanpur 208016
INDIA
Email: boruah@iitk.ac.in
Email: bhboruah@yahoo.com
Buddha's World
[For a comparison of the
Sunyata of
Buddhism with the philosophy of Christian Mysticism as espoused by Meister
Eckhart go to this article.]
